Thanks to the folks over at Twinkie Town for pointing out this video.
I would buy 100 copies of "The Show" if it guaranteed this would happen in real life.
PS: Upon a second viewing, three things bother me (keep in mind that the umpire in me comes out every so often)
1) Casilla doesn't touch second.
2) The home plate umpire would never have his mask on for a tag at home.
3) The home plate umpire's "safe" mechanic is awful.
Saturday, February 26, 2011
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
Why I Fear Change
Joe Mauer has a newly-minted contract to market Head and Shoulders shampoo. He's also gracing the cover of MLB:The Show for the second year in a row. You have to go back to Kevin Garnett with Adidas and Daunte Culpepper on Madden ‘02 to find the last instances of Minnesota sports team members having this kind of publicity.
The Twins posted the highest bid for negotiating rights with Tsuyoshi Nishioka and could now possibly be faced with the same press-box real estate issues that the Mariners and Yankees/Angels have dealt with since the arrivals of Japanese superstars Ichiro and Hideki Matsui. Only time will tell if Nishioka can be mentioned in the same breath as those two from an impact standpoint, but for right now, he has a media entourage that no single Twins player has ever drawn.
In 2002, the year of their first Central Division title with Ron Gardenhire, the Twins ranked 27th in baseball payroll. This year, their projected payroll of $110-$115 million puts them among the top ten spenders in baseball and has them on track to make the transition from a revenue-sharing receiver to a revenue-sharing giver.
The term “small-market” no longer applies. One could argue it hasn't applied since the Twins signed Mauer to an extension and opened their new stadium last spring. The re-signings of Thome, Pavano, and posting/signing of Nishioka further take down the “small-market” tag. As a lifetime Twins fan, I'm having a hard time deciding how I feel about this.
After all, aren't the Twins the perfect example of the right way to run a business? Instead of making high-risk, high-reward investments (big free agent signings), the Twins spent the 1990s and early 2000s with a primary focus on developing young, “home-grown” talent. For example:
Home-grown Players, 2002 Division Title Team
Eddie Guardado
The only major contributors that aren't on this list are Cristian Guzman, Dustin Mohr, and some starting pitchers. Let's not forget that another piece of this team was a great trade by Terry Ryan: Chuck Knoblauch for Eric Milton, Guzman, Brian Buchanan AND cash.
These guys along with the rest of the roster in 2002 cost the Twins $40,225,000. (Which represented a 66% increase from 2001). Now I know inflation is a reality, but for perspective, this year the Twins will pay $38,000,000 just for Mauer and Morneau.
My point is that the Twins developed talent on a budget and won games. Since these players were young, they were able to keep a cheap nucleus and keep winning in the following years. The Twins cracked 2 million fans in 2005 for the first time since 1993 (after barely drawing 1 million in 2000). Improved attendance led to improved revenue, and more importantly for the team's bottom line, growing support for a new stadium.
From there, revenues and attendance have only continued to improve while the team has continued to “succeed”. The goal of any business is to work within their means to generate success - taking acceptable risks along the way as long as the payoffs make it worth it. This early part of last decade was successful without big-name free agent signings and long term contract obligations. The fact that the Twins won from within and that none of their early Gardenhire-era division championships were simply "bought" makes the successes that much sweeter.
The Twins may no longer be "small-market", but it's because of their own hard work. It's paying off with another season of a healthy chance to win the division and 3 million-plus tickets sold. This is something that makes the organization and Twins fans (myself included) proud.
On the other hand, it's a bit of a bother to lose the “small-market” label. For me it awakens fears both about the organization's future strategies and our expectations as fans.
My first fear is likely an unfounded one considering the consistency that the Twins have exhibited over the years in both player and organizational management (they've only had 3 GMs and 3 managers in my lifetime). I've enjoyed the fact that a number of good Twins players have come from within the Twins farm systems - I'm someone who likes following the progress of prospects and seeing them do well with the big league team. While neither of them know me from the man in the moon, I feel more "connected" to Mauer and Morneau than Dodger fans did to Manny Ramirez. I'm not saying I'd turn away Albert Pujols if he wanted to play here, but the fact that the nucleus of the Twins are players who have been around a while makes them more fun to watch. I hope that the movement away from the small market doesn't diminish the team's valuing of player development.
Another fear is diminishing efficiency. The fact is that higher payroll and more wins are not strongly correlated. This was not only proven by the '02/'03/'04 Twins, but also the A's (earlier in the decade), the Marlins, and most recently the Rays. While the payroll has increased 275% since 2002, the Twins won 94 games in '02 and 94 games last year.
The thinking behind the $60 million more the Twins are spending nowadays is that they're not paying to win more regular season games, but they're paying win the games that matter in October. The saddest reality is that only the 2002 team advanced beyond the Divisional Round of the playoffs. And this is my biggest personal fear about the move away from small market-dom: With higher payrolls come higher expectations, and conversely, bigger disappointments for everyone involved when those expectations are not met.
For much of the last decade it was easy to be happy with division championships, but the last two years have seemed like letdowns. The fact that the majority of the playoff losses have been to the Yankees made last year an exceptionally bitter pill to swallow. This is a foreign feeling to Twins fans who weren't around for the playoff losses to the Orioles in the 70's - in my lifetime, the Twins have either won the World Series, completely sucked, or come out of nowhere to be successful with a team that wasn't expected to be good. Last year, the excuses were gone and "at least we won the division" was not a satisfactory consolation prize. I'm not used to being disappointed in the Twins, I don't like being disappointed in the Twins, and I'm afraid of continuing to be disappointed in the Twins. There, I said it. Maybe this is just baseball fan growing pains, but I still don't like it.
But what am I saying? Spring isn't a time for baseball fears. It's the time when "there's always next year" gives way to "this could be the year". There are a lot of reasons to be nervous about this year's team, but there are a lot of things to look forward to as well. When I'm sitting at the park on a perfect July night washing down a Kramarczuk's bratwurst with a cold Grain Belt all while watching Liriano strikeout AJ Pierzynski with a mind-bending slider, none of the above fears will be on my mind. And if July turns to October and Joe Mauer is hoisting the Commissioner's Trophy above his head - I'll be able to say to my fears: "You're not even a has-been. You're a never-was."
Bring on baseball season with all it's ups, downs, fears, and triumphs.
The Twins posted the highest bid for negotiating rights with Tsuyoshi Nishioka and could now possibly be faced with the same press-box real estate issues that the Mariners and Yankees/Angels have dealt with since the arrivals of Japanese superstars Ichiro and Hideki Matsui. Only time will tell if Nishioka can be mentioned in the same breath as those two from an impact standpoint, but for right now, he has a media entourage that no single Twins player has ever drawn.
In 2002, the year of their first Central Division title with Ron Gardenhire, the Twins ranked 27th in baseball payroll. This year, their projected payroll of $110-$115 million puts them among the top ten spenders in baseball and has them on track to make the transition from a revenue-sharing receiver to a revenue-sharing giver.
The term “small-market” no longer applies. One could argue it hasn't applied since the Twins signed Mauer to an extension and opened their new stadium last spring. The re-signings of Thome, Pavano, and posting/signing of Nishioka further take down the “small-market” tag. As a lifetime Twins fan, I'm having a hard time deciding how I feel about this.
On one hand, it makes me proud to see the Twins shed the “small-market” moniker.
After all, aren't the Twins the perfect example of the right way to run a business? Instead of making high-risk, high-reward investments (big free agent signings), the Twins spent the 1990s and early 2000s with a primary focus on developing young, “home-grown” talent. For example:
Home-grown Players, 2002 Division Title Team
Eddie Guardado
LaTroy Hawkins
Torii Hunter
Jacque Jones
Corey Koskie
Doug Mientkiewicz
AJ Pierzynski
Brad Radke
Luis Rivas
JC Romero
The only major contributors that aren't on this list are Cristian Guzman, Dustin Mohr, and some starting pitchers. Let's not forget that another piece of this team was a great trade by Terry Ryan: Chuck Knoblauch for Eric Milton, Guzman, Brian Buchanan AND cash.
These guys along with the rest of the roster in 2002 cost the Twins $40,225,000. (Which represented a 66% increase from 2001). Now I know inflation is a reality, but for perspective, this year the Twins will pay $38,000,000 just for Mauer and Morneau.
My point is that the Twins developed talent on a budget and won games. Since these players were young, they were able to keep a cheap nucleus and keep winning in the following years. The Twins cracked 2 million fans in 2005 for the first time since 1993 (after barely drawing 1 million in 2000). Improved attendance led to improved revenue, and more importantly for the team's bottom line, growing support for a new stadium.
From there, revenues and attendance have only continued to improve while the team has continued to “succeed”. The goal of any business is to work within their means to generate success - taking acceptable risks along the way as long as the payoffs make it worth it. This early part of last decade was successful without big-name free agent signings and long term contract obligations. The fact that the Twins won from within and that none of their early Gardenhire-era division championships were simply "bought" makes the successes that much sweeter.
The Twins may no longer be "small-market", but it's because of their own hard work. It's paying off with another season of a healthy chance to win the division and 3 million-plus tickets sold. This is something that makes the organization and Twins fans (myself included) proud.
On the other hand, it's a bit of a bother to lose the “small-market” label. For me it awakens fears both about the organization's future strategies and our expectations as fans.
My first fear is likely an unfounded one considering the consistency that the Twins have exhibited over the years in both player and organizational management (they've only had 3 GMs and 3 managers in my lifetime). I've enjoyed the fact that a number of good Twins players have come from within the Twins farm systems - I'm someone who likes following the progress of prospects and seeing them do well with the big league team. While neither of them know me from the man in the moon, I feel more "connected" to Mauer and Morneau than Dodger fans did to Manny Ramirez. I'm not saying I'd turn away Albert Pujols if he wanted to play here, but the fact that the nucleus of the Twins are players who have been around a while makes them more fun to watch. I hope that the movement away from the small market doesn't diminish the team's valuing of player development.
Another fear is diminishing efficiency. The fact is that higher payroll and more wins are not strongly correlated. This was not only proven by the '02/'03/'04 Twins, but also the A's (earlier in the decade), the Marlins, and most recently the Rays. While the payroll has increased 275% since 2002, the Twins won 94 games in '02 and 94 games last year.
The thinking behind the $60 million more the Twins are spending nowadays is that they're not paying to win more regular season games, but they're paying win the games that matter in October. The saddest reality is that only the 2002 team advanced beyond the Divisional Round of the playoffs. And this is my biggest personal fear about the move away from small market-dom: With higher payrolls come higher expectations, and conversely, bigger disappointments for everyone involved when those expectations are not met.
For much of the last decade it was easy to be happy with division championships, but the last two years have seemed like letdowns. The fact that the majority of the playoff losses have been to the Yankees made last year an exceptionally bitter pill to swallow. This is a foreign feeling to Twins fans who weren't around for the playoff losses to the Orioles in the 70's - in my lifetime, the Twins have either won the World Series, completely sucked, or come out of nowhere to be successful with a team that wasn't expected to be good. Last year, the excuses were gone and "at least we won the division" was not a satisfactory consolation prize. I'm not used to being disappointed in the Twins, I don't like being disappointed in the Twins, and I'm afraid of continuing to be disappointed in the Twins. There, I said it. Maybe this is just baseball fan growing pains, but I still don't like it.
But what am I saying? Spring isn't a time for baseball fears. It's the time when "there's always next year" gives way to "this could be the year". There are a lot of reasons to be nervous about this year's team, but there are a lot of things to look forward to as well. When I'm sitting at the park on a perfect July night washing down a Kramarczuk's bratwurst with a cold Grain Belt all while watching Liriano strikeout AJ Pierzynski with a mind-bending slider, none of the above fears will be on my mind. And if July turns to October and Joe Mauer is hoisting the Commissioner's Trophy above his head - I'll be able to say to my fears: "You're not even a has-been. You're a never-was."
Bring on baseball season with all it's ups, downs, fears, and triumphs.
Saturday, February 19, 2011
The AL Central Aces, 2011
Looking ahead to 2011 requires a quick examination of the past. What follows is a quick snapshot of the aces of the AL Central (according to mlbdepthcharts.com) and how they go about their business. I’ve included their Marcel (via Fangraphs) projections for K/9, BB/9, HR/9 and FIP (Fielding Independent Pitching). Also, I’ve ranked each pitcher according to my thoughts, using the best projected pitcher in the AL Central (Verlander) as the benchmark (100). You could say this means I think that Francisco Liriano is 96% as good as Justin Verlander.
(100) DET: Justin Verlander (R) 8.72/2.85/0.69 - 3.18
Justin Verlander stands out as most likely to be the best starting pitcher in the American League Central this year. He made a paradigm shift in his pitching last year, using in 2010 the most effective change-up in his six year big league career. He also relied less on the fastball that made him so dominant in 2009, and for the first time was able to use a slider to positive effect. He went from a pitcher who threw fastballs roughly 65% of the time for the first five years of his career to someone who threw only 58% fastballs last year. He saw a slight decline in strikeouts from 2009 to 2010 due to the fact that he wasn’t throwing his power pitch as often, but was also not hit as hard and saw his ground-ball rate improve due to mixing in craftier, harder-to-predict pitches.
(96) MIN: Francisco Liriano (L) 8.51/3.23/0.75 - 3.48
Francisco Liriano stands to put up similar (if not better) strikeout numbers than Verlander, but is hampered by well-documented control issues. Last year he picked up the confidence he once had in his slider, throwing it over a third of the time (vs. 26% coming back from surgery in 2008 and 2009). Of course, the slider isn't quite as frightening as it was when he first came up in the bigs. He doesn’t throw it as fast or miss as many bats as he used to, but it’s still the most devastating slider in Major League Baseball and hopefully he’s throwing it in such a way that it doesn't kill his elbow again.
His control was also much improved last year, specifically his ability to throw the first pitch over the plate for a strike. Target Field should even help him by forgiving a hanging slider or two throughout the year. I don’t know if he’s working on developing his change-up (a pitch he throws 18% of the time), but finding a way to turn that into a more above-average pitch would seem like a logical next step for both the southpaw’s craftiness and arm health.
(89) CWS: Mark Buehrle (L) 4.91/2.21/0.87 - 4.03
Mark Buehrle’s K/9 and BB/9 rates are both so low, he looks like he belongs more to Rick Anderson than Ozzie Guillen. He’s also probably the least “ace-like” on this list when it comes to traditional power-pitching tendencies of ace pitchers. A fastball/cutter/change-up pitcher, he relies on his ability to place the ball exactly where he wants because he doesn’t posses the velocity to strike hitters out. Buehrle’s stats the last two seasons are remarkably consistent: just over 200 IP, right around 100 K and 50 BBs. The only major change was a drop in HRs allowed (27 in 2009, 17 in 2010). This could be due to his decision to decrease use of his cutter (25% in 2009, 15% in 2010) and use his fastball more. While his fastball tops out around 87 MPH, his cutter is not as effective as it was in 2007 and 2008. When he got taken deep a bunch in 2009, he may have decided it was due to a lack of life on the cutter and moved away from it last year.
(83) KCR: Luke Hochevar (R) 6.55/3.10/1.01 - 4.23
2010 was a year of pitching changes for Kansas City’s Luke Hochevar as well. Looking at his pitch type data, he significantly decreased his slider and curveball rates (23% to 12% and 13% to 9%, respectively) and discovered instead a cutter and a change-up. This is interesting considering that his slider was one of the most effective in baseball in 2009. He still favored the slider when far ahead in the count. The paradigm shift seemed to cause a few problems. He was throwing his fastball harder last year (91 MPH career avg vs. 93 MPH last year), and the cutter has much more velocity than his slider. This means he decided to sacrifice spin in the name of velocity (whether this was to avoid injury, I don’t know). It worked for him, because he missed more bats than ever last year in April, May, and June. In June of last year he went on the 60 Day DL with elbow strain. He came back for five starts in September in which he seemed to throw more tentatively. Whether this is a harbinger of more elbow problems to come or not remains to be seen. It will also be interesting to see if his fastball has as much life this year, and what he decides to do about throwing his cutter vs. his slider. If he can regain his early to mid-season form, he is liable to outperform his projections by a decent margin.
(82) CLE: Fausto Carmona (R) 5.66/3.64/0.81 - 4.34
2010 marked the full-time return of Fausto Carmona to the ranks of starting pitchers in Major League Baseball. Back in the days when he burst onto the scene (2007), he had a sinker that had him posting ridiculous GB rates (64%). After a hip injury limited his 2008 participation, he came back in 2009 and had lost all ability to sink his fastball, earning him a demotion all the way to single-A. In 2010 he came back, re-discovering a sense of control (dropping his BB/9 from 5 to 3) and got the job done with a mix of an above-average fastball, slider, and the most effective change-up he’s had in the last few years. Hitters are making a little more contact than before and getting the ball in the air more, but his increase in FB% is tempered by the fact that a disproportionately high number of his fly balls are pop-ups (as opposed to near home-runs). Considering that his improved control is the result of finding a new mix of pitches, I think it’s reasonable to expect him to outperform his projections this year, especially when it comes to BB/9.
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